









How, if at all, Should Credit Ratings Agencies (CRAs) be Regulated? 
C.A.E. Goodhart 
 
Financial Markets Reform 
 
 
No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, 
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or 
retrieval system, without permission from the Initiative for Policy Dialogue. 
 
 1






The role of credit ratings agencies (CRAs) is to forecast the probability that the issuer 
of a debt liability will default on the due repayment (its probability of default, PD).  In 
this respect, CRAs are one of a large set of institutions and people who seek to 
forecast certain aspects of the future.3  As a generality, the only, or at any rate the 
most important, requisite of a forecast is its accuracy.  So long as the forecast is 
accurate, it is largely beside the point how the forecaster behaves otherwise, whether 
they lead a blameless life, or alternatively are rude to their parents, beat their children 
or cheat on their spouses, etc.  Moreover, in the case of CRAs, (unlike the Delphic 
oracle), the forecast is not only relatively clear in content, (though we shall consider 
later how it could, and should, be made even clearer), but also the status of the event 
being forecast, i.e. whether the issuer defaults, or not, on due repayment, is also 
relatively clear – and any remaining fuzziness often becomes subject to a legal 
decision.  So the forecasting activities of CRAs should be susceptible to ex post 
accountability.  Compare forecast with out-turn; assess and publish the comparative 
accuracy of the various CRAs’ and leave competition4 to do the rest.  We shall review 
what extra steps need to be taken to enhance such ex post accountability, comparing 
forecast with outcome, and comment briefly on how, perhaps, to enhance 
competition. 
 If the time gap between forecast and out-turn was very short, as for example in 
the case of someone tipping horses for that day’s races (though even here the tipster 
may have a separate agenda – a principal/agent problem), it is arguable that proper ex 
post accountability is all that is needed.  A cause for concern with CRAs is, however, 
that the lapse of time, between forecast and out-turn, is often rather long, measured in 
years rather than days.  Hence, if the CRA is paid by the issuer of the debt, it may pay 
 3
the current CRA executives to shade their forecast in a more favorable light.  By the 
time that their more enthusiastic prediction is shown to be ex post over-optimistic, 
these executives will have probably moved on to another job, or retirement, having 
pocketed enhanced earnings along the way.  Even if such concerns amongst the users 
of ratings are exaggerated and misplaced, as they probably are, they serve to damage 
CRAs’ credibility.  Like Caesar’s wife, the mechanism for making payments to them 
should place them beyond suspicion.  Again, we shall discuss how this might be done 
below. 
 In this chapter, I shall start with a brief record of the recent history of the 
attempts to regulate the CRA.  Then I consider whether the current payment system 
does involve conflicts of interest, and, if so, what to do about that.  In the third section 
I briefly discuss why, besides conflicts of interest, there may be a case for some kind 
of official intervention, and what forms it should not take, i.e. some other proposals 
for reform.  The fourth section describes how, and why, existing ratings are 
systematically misused by investors, and then go on to unveil my main 
recommendation which is the establishment of an independent body, (to be paid for 
by the CRAs) to assess and publish reports on the relative accuracy of such CRAs.  In 
the sixth section, we review whether there is a case for additional, pecuniary, penalties 
on CRAs with a forecasting record worse ex post than they have advertised ex ante (to 
try to establish truth in advocating/forecasting).  In the seventh section, we consider 
what effects these proposals may have on competition amongst, and entry into, the set 
of CRAs.  In the eighth section, the question of how ratings transitions should be 




Some Recent History 
 
The most important market for CRAs is the United States.  In the United States, 
CRAs have come under the oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). 
  
Since 1975, the SEC has relied on credit ratings from ‘market-recognised 
credible’ rating agencies in order to distinguish between grades of 
creditworthiness in various regulations under the U.S. federal securities laws.5 
 
These credit rating agencies, known as "nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations" or "NRSROs", are recognized as such by SEC staff based on, among 
other things, acceptance of a firm's credit ratings by predominant users of securities 
ratings. While eight firms have been recognized as NRSROs to date, consolidation 
has resulted in the following four NRSROs at present: Moody's Investors Service, 
Inc., Fitch, Inc., Standard & Poor's, a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 
and Dominion Bond Rating Service Limited. 
 During the past thirty years, SEC staff has developed a number of objective 
criteria for assessing NRSRO status. Under current practice, the SEC staff reviews a 
credit rating agency's operations, position in the marketplace, and other specific 
factors to determine whether it should be considered an NRSRO. 
 The single most important factor in the SEC staff's assessment of NRSRO 
status is whether a credit rating agency is "nationally recognized" in the United States 
as an issuer of credible and reliable ratings by the predominant users of securities 
ratings. The SEC staff also reviews the operational capability and reliability of each 
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credit rating agency.  In view of the growing importance of credit ratings to investors 
and other market participants, and the influence credit ratings have on the securities 
markets, in recent years, the SEC and U.S. Congress have reviewed a number of 
issues regarding credit rating agencies and, in particular, the subject of their 
regulatory oversight.” (CESR/05 – 139b, CESR’s technical advice to the European 
Commission on possible measures concerning credit rating agencies, pp 7/8). 
 What sparked the first round of concern with CRAs in the current century was 
the collapse of Enron and of several other companies which were found to be 
fraudulent after the bust of the NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations) bubble in 2001.  The CRAs had been patently slow in spotting 
these, and some maintained that they should, and could, have done better in this 
respect.  Moreover, any such shortcomings amongst CRAs were becoming more 
worrying in view of their potentially enhanced role under the standardized version of 
Pillar 1 of Basel II. 
 So the aftermath of the Enron debacle led to a flurry of exercises to explore 
what might be done to improve the workings of CRAs, both nationally and 
internationally.  Nationally, the most important study was done by the SEC6, though 
France and the UK also participated via the AFTE (Association Francaise des 
Tresoriers d’Entreprise) and ACT (Association of Corporate Treasurers) respectively 
in such exercises.  Since the main CRAs all operated internationally, arguably the 
more important forum became the Technical Committee of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which formed a taskforce, under 
the Chairmanship of Commissioner Campos of the SEC “to examine certain key 
issues regarding the role CRAs play in securities markets”, (IOSCO, ‘Report on the 
Activities of Credit Rating Agencies’, September 2003, p. 1).  This issued two 
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Reports in September 2003; the first, above-mentioned, report provided a general, and 
excellent, description7 of the work of CRAs, informed by a questionnaire to, (amongst 
others), and discussions with the CRAs.  The second Report was the more important.  
Its main content was a Statement of Principles to be used by CRAs, as indicated by its 
title, ‘IOSCO Statement of Principles regarding the Activities of Credit Rating 
Agencies’, (25 September 2003). 
 No serious rationale was provided to explain why a code of conduct or 
statement of principles would be helpful.8  Admittedly, regulators were then so 
engaged in the process of drawing up standards, codes of conduct, principles, etc.—all 
to be checked by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) in its ROSC (Report on 
Observance of Standards and Codes) exercises—that any justification may have 
seemed otiose.  There were four main principles discussed.  
 
Quality and Integrity of the Rating Process. 
 
CRAs should endeavor to issue opinions that help reduce the asymmetry of 
information among borrowers, lenders and other market participants. [with five sub-
headings] 
 
Independence and Conflicts of Interest 
 
CRA ratings decisions should be independent and free from political or economic 
pressures and from conflicts of interest arising due to the CRAs’ ownership structure, 
business or financial activities, or the financial interests of the CRAs’ employees.  
CRAs should, as far as possible, avoid activities, procedures or relationships that may 
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compromise or appear to compromise the independence and objectivity of the credit 
rating operations. [plus six sub-headings] 
 
Transparency and Timeliness of Ratings Disclosure 
 
CRAs should make disclosure and transparency an objective in their ratings activities. 




CRAs should maintain in confidence all non-public information communicated to 
them by any issuer, or its agents, under the terms of a confidentiality agreement or 
otherwise under a mutual understanding that the information is shared confidentially. 
[with two sub-headings] 
 In the introduction, I claimed that there were two key issues for forecasters—
CRAs ex post accountability and conflicts of interest—with a third important question 
of competition.  The only sub-heading on ex post accountability (3.4)9 left it to the 
CRAs themselves what to publish.  The key section on conflicts of interest (2.4)10 was 
a perfectly reasonable statement of objectives rather than providing any guidance on 
how to identify and remove such conflicts.  There was no mention of competition 
between CRAs.  Since there is no international law on issues such as this, 
international bodies, such as IOSCO or BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision), cannot and do not discuss the question of sanctions for non-performance 
or how to enforce any such principles, except by peer pressure. 
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 Following this Statement of Principles, the main CRAs issued their own 
individual codes.  What changes of behavior followed, if any, are difficult to 
ascertain.  In particular, they have not prevented the CRAs from coming under 
renewed attack in the last couple of years, notably for having over-optimistic ratings 
for mortgage-backed structured products,11 in some part, it is alleged, because of 
continuing conflicts of interest.12 
 Nevertheless, until at least very recently, the IOSCO code of conduct has 
remained the centerpiece of such regulatory efforts and discussion, vis-à-vis the 
CRAs, as have continued.  In December 2004, IOSCO extended the Principles into “a 
more specific and detailed code of conduct giving guidance on how the Principles 
could be implemented in practice” (Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating 
Agencies, Technical Committee of IOSCO, December 2004).  This took the four main 
principles, with the wording marginally revised, and expanded the number of sub-
headings to 18, 16, 18 and 2 respectively.  There were some additional conflicts of 
interest, (in Sections 2.5 and 2.8).13  How far these extra clauses altered CRA 
procedures would be difficult to discover without an in-depth exercise.  The one 
section on checking outcomes, (now 3.8), remained essentially unchanged, and there 
continued to be nothing about competition. 
 Other reviews, apart from that of the Technical Committee of IOSCO, have 
been done by the Committee on European Securities Regulation (CESR), which has 
published three such reports in March 2005 on “CESR’s technical advice to the 
European Commission on possible measures concerning credit ratings agencies” 
(CESR/05 – 139b).  This report largely rubber-stamped the earlier IOSCO reports and 
two more recent studies on ‘The role of credit rating agencies in structured finance’   
(February 2008)and its second report on the same topic (CESR/08 – 277 May 2008).14  
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This latter continued to advocate making a voluntary code of conduct the centerpiece 
of regulatory oversight, but now to be overseen by an additional monitoring body.15  
How anyone can monitor such a waffly set of pious objectives is far from clear. 
 Meanwhile the Technical Committee of IOSCO has now also reported in 
March 2008 with a consultation paper on ‘The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in 
Structured Markets’.  In this paper, the Committee proposed a number of minor 
modifications to their original code of conduct, (see Section on ‘Recommendations’).  
They have followed this with a further note (Final Report) on ‘The Role of Credit 
Rating Agencies in Structured Finance Models’, (May 2008).  Apart from a new 
section on ‘Competition’ (pp 13/14), which does not provide any recommendations, it 
offers yet another marginal re-write of the Code of Conduct. 
 But not everyone remained convinced that a revamp of the existing codes of 
conduct would do.  Particularly, in, a column in the Financial Times on 16 June 2008, 
Nicki Tait and Gillian Tett reported on a forthcoming speech by Charlie McCreevy, 
the EU internal markets commissioner entitled ‘Brussels to crack down on ratings 
agencies’. 
 
“Mr. McCreevy is to make clear that nothing short of regulatory supervision 
will do.  I am now convinced that limited but mandatory, well-targeted and 
robust internal governance reforms are going to be imperative to complement 
stronger external oversight of rating agencies … I have concluded that a 
regulatory solution at the European level is now necessary to deal with some 
of the core issues." 
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The announcement comes just weeks after the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions proposed changes to the industry code of conduct, a code Mr. 
McCreevy will make clear falls far short of what is needed. 
 In withering language, Mr. McCreevy will describe the code as "a toothless 
wonder" and point out that "no supervisor appears to have got as much as a sniff of 
the rot at the heart of the structured finance rating process before it all blew up".  He 
will say that he is "deeply skeptical" about its usefulness. "Many of the recent IOSCO 
task-force recommendations do not appear enforceable in a meaningful way," he will 
suggest.” 
 Similarly Mr. Cuomo, the Attorney General in New York State moved to 
introduce new constraints on CRAs’ pricing of their services in respect of rating 
structured products.  It is to this subject that we now turn. 
 
Conflicts of Interest:  Notably in the Ratings of Structured Products 
 
There are two dimensions to criticism of CRAs in their relationship with issuers of 
structured products, one that I regard as largely invalid, but one that may have some 
force. 
 Let us turn now to the first, mainly incorrect, allegation—that CRAs provided 
undue assistance to issuers of securitized products.  This is a misplaced criticism, not 
because the CRAs did not provide such help, but because it was their duty to do so.  
Thus, IOSCO’s own code of conduct, Sections 3.5 and 3.716 state:  
 
the CRA should inform the issuer of the critical information and principal 
considerations upon which a rating will be based and afford the issuer an 
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opportunity to clarify any likely factual misperceptions or other matters that 
the CRA would wish to be made aware of in order to produce an accurate 
rating.”   
 
In short, a CRA is obliged to inform issuers of the details of the techniques used to 
assign ratings and to answer questions of clarification about such methodologies.  Of 
course, issuers of structured products can, and will, use such assistance to place their 
product just above some desired threshold. 
 Irrespective of the fact that IOSCO’s own code of conduct requires CRAs to 
assist issuers of securitized products with information to enable them to structure their 
product so as to achieve a desired rating, why might this practice be undesirable?  
More information is better than less.  It is only if CRAs, and issuers, jointly apply a 
rating that CRAs, at bottom, believe are too high is there a problem here.  So long as 
CRAs assess PDs correctly, and make that information public, then this question of 
inappropriate relationships, and conflict of interest, can be seen as a canard. 
 The latter is the real question.  Might conflicts of interest lead to a distortion of 
publicly stated ratings of securitized products, especially since ratings agencies are 
paid by the issuers, not by investors?  In general, the accuracy of a CRA’s ratings is 
protected by its need to maintain its reputation.  The importance of reputation was 
spelt out in IOSCO’s September 2003 Report, (p. 10/11). 
 The most common conflict of interest cited by taskforce members was that 
larger CRAs receive most of their revenue from the issuers that they rate.  Where a 
CRA receives revenue from an issuer, the CRA may be inclined to downplay the 
credit risk it poses in order to retain the issuer's business.  The CRAs responding to 
the Task Force’s questionnaire stated that they are aware of this potential conflict of 
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interest and attempt to mitigate its influence by ensuring that no particular issuer 
constitutes any significant portion of the CRA's overall revenue. These firms claim 
that, because credit ratings from a particular firm are only valuable insofar as the firm 
maintains a reputation for independence, accuracy and thoroughness, CRAs would be 
unwilling to risk damaging their reputations just to retain a single client.  
Furthermore, while issuers may prefer to use a credit rating from a firm with 
relatively lax rating standards, investors are unlikely to accord such ratings much 
weight and the issuer would pay higher costs for the capital it is trying to raise. 
 CRAs also note that CRA analyst compensation is not linked to issuer fees. 
According to the CRA respondents, this, combined with the use of rating committees, 
removes the likelihood that the rating process will be inappropriately influenced. 
 Competition is also important.  Insofar as debt issuers are rated by two or 
more agencies and/or that identical products are rated by different agencies, a 
tendency for one agency to become systematically lax should become evident quite 
quickly, even before actual default events could demonstrate the relative accuracy of 
the CRAs.  Of course collusion is possible, but the damage to reputation, if caught, 
would be overwhelming. 
 So, the essential question is whether there are some features of the process of 
rating structured products that make the standard safeguards of reputation and 
competition less effective in their case.  This may be so.  The incentive to over-rate to 
gain a fee is negligible on traditional corporate business.  Corporate rating fees are 
quite small—why risk the company’s reputation to gain a fee?  But structured issues 
are different in two respects.  First, it was a new business and has been earning super-
normal profits – especially for the investment bankers proposing the issues, but also 
(in a smaller way) for the CRAs.  With fees generally higher in relation to marginal 
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costs than is the case for a corporate rating, the incentive to over-rate to secure a fee is 
that much greater.  (And the investment bankers proposing a deal can be 
demanding—they want their high bonuses for getting the issue away).  Secondly, 
whereas a company would normally want to be rated by all the major agencies—or at 
least two of them—structured issues are often rated by only one or two agencies.  The 
company seeks out the agency that will give the highest rating (or demand the least 
credit-enhancement to achieve the desired ratings); the other agencies are then not 
used.  That indicates a prima facie case for bias. 
 This analysis suggests potential remedies, much along the lines already 
proposed by New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo (Dow Jones News services, 
June 6, 2008).  First, require all issuers to pay for advice/analysis separately from the 
rating to prevent issuers asking several CRAs for their ratings assessment, and then 
only paying the agency offering the most optimistic rating.  Second, require more 
precise disclosure of ratings’ fees.  Third, require all issuers of structured, securitized 
products, to obtain, and have published, a rating from two or more, CRAs.  This latter 
obligation would also be justifiable on the grounds that such products are more 
complex and opaque.  It could also serve to encourage more competition amongst 
CRAs.  Finally, there is a major need, as elaborated below, for an independent 
assessment body to check on the accuracy of CRAs’ predictions of PD. 
 An alternative approach has been proposed in the consultation document 
issued by the SEC (17 CFR Parts 240 and 249b, RIN 3235 – AK14, June 11, 2008. p. 
30). 
 
To address this conflict…as a condition to the NRSRO rating a structured 
finance product the information provided to the NRSRO and used by the 
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NRSRO in determining the credit rating would need to be disclosed through a 
means designed to provide reasonably broad dissemination of the information.  
The intent behind this disclosure is to create the opportunity for other 
NRSROs to use the information to rate the instrument as well.  Any resulting 
‘unsolicited ratings could be used by market participants to evaluate the 
ratings issued by the NRSRO hired to rate the product and, in turn, potentially 
expose an NRSRO whose ratings were influenced by the desire to gain favor 
with the arranger in order to obtain more business. 
   
While there are several features to be applauded in this proposal, notably the 
use of ex post accountability rather than codes of conduct, the encouragement of 
competition and the reliance on market mechanisms rather than government 
intervention, I doubt they would work for several reasons.  First, it requires any issuer, 
either directly or via its CRAs of such a product, to provide full details of any new 
structured product to any potential CRA.  What might happen if a competitor were to 
set up a subsidiary CRA with the purpose of discovering competitive details?  Could 
such details be kept confidential in such a regime?  I wonder whether issuers of 
structured products would be willing to accept such a disclosure obligation. 
 Second, the proposal would work by having CRA competitors undertake more 
conservative (i.e. less favorable) unsolicited ratings.  A representative sample of such 
products would have to be rated by the unsolicited CRA in order to establish that the 
initial (solicited) CRA had a pattern of excessively optimistic ratings.  This would be 
quite expensive.  Insofar as ratings were paid for by issuers, it is not clear why the 
publication of such “knocking copy”, in the guise of lower unsolicited ratings, would 
ever gain more commissions. 
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 So this proposal could only benefit those CRAs whose receipts came from the 
“buy-side”, e.g. Egan Jones.  While it might provide them with an enhanced 
marketing benefit, it would lead to another problem.  Suppose that those unsolicited 
ratings, sold onto subscribers, were in some sense superior.  Then these subscribers 
would be in command of relevant market information not available to others.  In line 
with the SEC’s own disclosures rules, unless specifically amended to promote buy-
side CRAs, such unsolicited ratings would have to be publicly published.  In which 
case they would be valueless, and there would be no incentive for such “unsolicited 
ratings” to be undertaken. 
 The SEC and IOSCO have then faced a conundrum.  It could promote buy-
side CRAs, enhance competition and encourage cross-checking of accuracy, but only 
if it is prepared to soften its own rulings of common disclosure of market relevant 
information.  Alternatively, it could stick by its own disclosure rules, and then these 
proposals would fail to achieve their intended purpose. 
 
Some Other Proposals for Reform 
 
In the pantheon of villains, on whom the current financial crisis is blamed, CRAs 
usually now receive a (dis)honorable mention, if not quite pride of place.  This has led 
to a wild variety of proposed “reforms”.   
 Perhaps almost as serious from the standpoint of the CRAs, their reputation 
has been damaged, and reputation is the key to their brand name. 
 It would be easy enough to put CRAs out of business, and some of the 
proposed reforms for them could do just that.  The problem is that CRSs do perform a 
public service.  It would be a massive waste of time if all investors had to run a 
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complete information-gathering exercise (due diligence) on all of their investments, 
however small a share of their overall portfolio.  They could not, and would not, do 
that.  So it represents a huge economy of time and effort to delegate such information 
gathering, sifting and dissemination to specialists, so long as one can trust them.  
 This latter is quite a qualification.  How does one ensure that CRAs are 
trustworthy?  There are numerous suggestions.  Most of them are, I believe, 
unworkable.  I list a number of the more common suggestions below: 
 
Involve the government, either as supervisors or as promoting an additional CRA to 
compete with the private CRAs 
 
To many, the idea that a public-sector CRA would be more trustworthy than a private 
sector CRA when rating public-sector debt, a local “national champion” or a failing 
company of political significance is an oxymoron.  Who would, for example, trust a 
French publicly established ratings agency to rate French “champion” objectively?  
More generally, any public sector involvement with CRAs as supervisor or overseer 
would tend to be held, by the public, as leading to public sector responsibility for the 
accuracy of CRA forecasts/opinions.  If a public sector body was to supervise a CRA 
in any way, it would be held to have given its imprimatur to such forecasts. 
 
Make the CRAs legally liable for their forecasts/opinions 
 
I cannot help wondering what would happen if governments, central banks, think-
tanks and economists were also to be made legally liable for their forecasts/opinions.  
We cannot see how such forecasting could continue.  Once legal liability is applied, 
the potential for open-ended damages, especially in the U.S. legal system, would, I 
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believe, make the whole business model of CRAs non-viable.  Those who press this 
line of attack need to explain how legal liability can remain sufficiently constrained to 
enable the services of CRAs to continue. 
 Although the most virulent attacks on CRAs have mostly come from the 
United States, the CRAs are, perhaps, more at risk from legal challenge in Europe 
where constitutional defense has less resonance. 
 
Prevent debt issuers paying CRAs, so the CRAs are forced to see payment from 
investors (the buy-side) 
 
The problem with this approach is that information, once publicly revealed, becomes 
a free public good.  In principle, every investor could subscribe individually and 
privately to one or more CRA and promise not to pass on that information.17  A 
problem is that promise would be hard to enforce.  Hundreds of employees at many 
financial institutions would have access to such ratings and could undercut the CRAs 
by making secondary markets.  Moreover, the information content in the ratings could 
soon be deduced from the actions of subscribing investors.  Newspapers would have 
an incentive to glean and publish accurate estimates of CRA ratings. 
Furthermore, in a context in which transparency is held to be a desideratum in 
almost all cases, is it appropriate to move to a system in which the business of 
providing ratings can only work if these are maintained privately by individual 
subscribers?18  Also, how do you price subscriptions so that retail investors can afford 
to see ratings, while banks/Other Financial Institutions (OFIs) pay massively more?  
Not impossible, but difficult/costly to get right.  Such a system would also be more 
difficult and time-consuming to run than the present one.   
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Some Failings in the Use of CRA Ratings 
 
Much of the problem with CRA ratings resides with their misuse by users rather than 
the mechanisms of their provision. 
 
Misuse of forecasts 
 
Forecasts tend to be systematically misused by their recipients n.b. this is usually only 
partially the fault of their providers.  Recipients of forecasts tend to focus unduly on 
the modal (or mean) forecast while ignoring or discounting the wide probability 
distribution (the higher moments), especially the uncertainty (confidence limits) and 
skewness of the forecast.  This has been encouraged by CRAs by the emphasis placed 
on the particular rating e.g. A or BBB, rather than the probability distribution of 
implied credit default or the potential volatility of ratings migration in each case. 
 When he introduced The Inflation Report in the UK in 1992/93, Mervyn King, 
then-Chief Economist at the Bank of England, tried to wean the recipients of his 
forecasts away from focusing on the most likely modal outcome by refusing to 
publish that number and publishing a fan chart instead.  It may well be the case that 
CRAs would have been prepared to publish similar fan charts of the one-sided 
probability of default for each rating notch had investors asked for that.  But they did 
not.  I believe that such forecast data can and should be made available.  I would 
propose that all ratings should be accompanied by a fan chart showing not only the 
prospective default probabilities attached by that CRA to that rating for each year19 of 
the rated product’s life, but also a measure of the uncertainty of that measure. 
An example is provided in Figure 9.1. 
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<Insert Figure 9.1> 
 
 Where X is a central tendency of PD, mean or mode and + and * are one-sided 
estimates, e.g. confidence interval, of the upward uncertainty relating to that forecast 
of PD.  Here, + shows the confidence interval for the mortgage-based structured 
product, while * gives the same confidence interval for a corporate bond.  The two 
have a completely different time path, even when the expectation of mean PD is, by 
construction, taken to be the same.  Under normal circumstances, uncertainty 
increases and confidence limits widen as the time horizon lengthens, i.e. the further 
into the future one looks.  This is, however, not so with mortgage-based structured 
products, as Mason and Rosner (2007) report20(Part III, pp 34-51, especially p. 48). 
 
In summary, because RMBS [Residential Mortgage Backed Securities] are 
constructed on the basis of mortgage pools that consist of static portfolios of 
fixed-income investments that become seasoned over time, performance over 
time becomes increasingly predictable.  That increased predictability results in 
RMBS ratings that telescope in quality towards either default or AAA.  
Furthermore, all the tranches of securities associated with a specific mortgage 
pool will migrate toward default or AAA together.  This all-or-nothing nature 
of the risk in structured finance is the source of relatively high AAA yields 
(and yields across the credit spectrum) that attract investors to the sector, as 
well as the source of concentrated defaults that have historically hit various 
ABS and RMBS sectors to date.  The problem with rating RMBS therefore is 
not that the future is hard to predict.  The problem is that the traditional ratings 
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process, when applied to RMBS, is being used to do things for which it is not 
designed. 
 
It is in this sense that RMBS have been sometimes described as “economic 
catastrophe” bonds.  It has yet to be completely determined how far the CRAs 
systematically underestimated mean PDs for RMBS, mainly by giving too little 
weight to the probability of housing price declines throughout the United States, and 
to the subsequent effect on default—‘jingle mail’.21  But what is clear is that once 
conditions started to deteriorate with RMBS, the volatility of ratings migration 
downwards was far more extreme than for plain corporate debt.  My assertion here is 
that difference in the essential kind can only be met by CRAs publishing additional 
detail on the prospective confidence limits (volatility) of their forecasts. 
 There may be little initial enthusiasm amongst investors for such extra 
information.  What most forecast users want is a simple mental crutch in the guise of 
a point forecast, rather than a more careful assessment of uncertainties.  Investors are 
ordinary people, and ordinary people are lazy.  Some may also have been complicit, 
in that they know that structured product ratings had greater risk, but consciously 
sought to move further along their return/risk-curve than their own investment 
constraints normally allowed.  Investors should, as a matter of public policy, be made 
aware of the uncertainties surrounding future forecasts of PD.  Suggestions have been 
made that ratings of structured products carry a different symbol.  That does not really 
catch the point that the risks of ratings migration are quite different and in a way that 
can be quantified and estimated, for RMBS as compared with corporate debt. 
 
The rating applied to a structured product cannot imply the same probability of 
default as an exactly similar rating applied to an underlying instrument 
 21
  
The point is that a structured product is precisely structured to achieve a particular 
ratings level.  Thus in the aggregate of such structured products, the mass is right at 
the bottom of the set of allowable conditions.  So the expected probability of default 
(PD) of a portfolio of structured instruments, all of which are correctly awarded an A 
rating, can potentially be higher than that of a portfolio of original underlying 
instruments of the same A rating.  Again, the proper way to handle this is to require 
CRAs to publish fan charts of PDs over the expected life of each product.  Then it will 
immediately become obvious that an AA of a structured product is not, and cannot, be 
the same as an AA of an underlying product. 
 
CRAs will be unduly pressured to provide ratings too soon 
 
Because of information asymmetries, a market for innovative investment products 
needs to have these rated.  Almost by definition, such products will be launched in 
favorable conditions.  So the CRAs will not know what will happen to correlations, 
PDs, etc., in adverse times for such instruments.  But they will nonetheless be under 
great pressure to issue such ratings, and their self-interest will tempt them to proceed 
despite the lack of sufficient time and life-history. 
Once more, the correct approach is not to ban ratings of new products, but to 
require the CRAs to expose their uncertainty by publishing fan charts, applicable to 
any rated new product, in which the upper line, recording uncertainty, should deviate 
much further from the modal forecast.  Of course, CRAs may fail to appreciate this 
problem (of too short of a data set) or knowingly publish tighter fan charts as a sales 
mechanism, but that is where the assessment and perhaps the penalties or pre-
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commitment mechanism kicks in.  If their estimate of PDs turns out to be overly 
optimistic, they are penalized. 
 
No mechanism for ex post evaluation of ratings 
 
The CRAs keep a record of the outcome of all their rated instruments, (default and 
when, or not).  They need this to revise their own methodologies.  Moreover, they 
mostly publish an account of their default and transition studies, though in some cases 
with full access limited to subscribers.  For example Fitch’s latest reports on 
structured and corporate ratings are available at the following links: 
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=384724 and 
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=383102. 
 But what they publish is what they independently choose to publish, which 
may incorrectly evoke some public cynicism because they can select what to report.  
Moreover, such independent publication of results makes comparison of relative 
accuracy between CRAs difficult or impossible. 
 Therefore, comparisons of relative forecast accuracy among CRAs cannot be 
made.  Moreover, there is relatively little call amongst investors for such comparative 
exercises to be done.  After the event, individual issuers and investors have no further 
individual interest in providing a public record of what happened and of how accurate 
the CRAs were.  However, there is a public interest in achieving ex post 
accountability. 
 
An Independent Assessment Institution 
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This leads directly to my main proposal, which is the establishment of an independent 
assessment institution to assess the accuracy of CRA estimates of PD and to publish 
comparative studies of such accuracy.  It would not have a wider responsibility for 
monitoring the behavior of some amorphous code of conduct.  Indeed, as noted at the 
outset, so long as the forecasts are accurate, the behavior of the forecaster in other 
respect is largely immaterial.  A subsidiary proposal, therefore, is that IOSCO’s code 
of conduct be scrapped.   
 What is needed is a small independent body—a CRA Assessment Centre 
(CRAAC).  All CRAs in every country should be required to place with CRAAC a 
record of each product rated and an initial quantified forecast of expected PD and a 
measure of the uncertainty of that forecast annually through the life of that product.  
At the extinction of the product (default, payment or repackaging) the CRA would 
again inform CRAAC.  The Centre would be essentially a data handling centre with 
few staff.  Members could have the ability to cross-check on the validity of CRA 
information.  It would be global in scope.  It would have to be set up under some 
national law and there should be a right of judicial repeal.  It should have the right to 
request information form CRAs. 
 Unfortunately, it would not be credible for the industry to set up such a body 
under its own direct control.  It would be for discussion whether the industry could 
finance a third party, perhaps a large accounting firm, to set up and establish the 
CRAAC or whether it would have to be done by governments.  As Willem Buiter has 
noted, ‘Self-regulation is to regulation, as self importance is to importance’.  
Moreover, penalties, some combination of reputation and pecuniary loss, may be 
necessary to insure that CRA estimates of PD are both as honest and accurate as 
possible, and are seen to be such. 
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 The key issue is to ensure that the product, a securitized instrument, is 
correctly rated at the outset when it is originated and sold.  At first sight, it might 
seem a reasonable idea, insofar as such ratings are based on fallible models, for the 
CRAAC also to be asked for a second opinion on model architecture and assumptions, 
but that would be dangerous since (a) there are fashions and common errors in model 
construction techniques as in most everything else; and (b) it would tend to make 
CRAAC complicit, rather than independent, in assessing model outcomes.  There may 
be a case for having such an independent body also assess the relative speed and 
accuracy of ratings transitions, but that could be left for later when the assessment 
body had been properly established, and was running effectively.  This is discussed 
further in the first section. 
 Again, it may be helpful to compare and contrast the proposal here with that 
contained in the SEC’s June 2008 consultation paper.  The SEC would have CRAs 
provide sufficient extra data to allow assessments of ex post accountability to be 
undertaken, but they would have the data made available to everyone whereas we 
would only require the CRAs to send it confidentially to CRAAC.  So the CRAs 
themselves would, I believe, find our proposal more acceptable. 
 Then, having obtained this massive accumulation of data, the SEC would 
leave it to:  
 
the marketplace to use the information on the history of each credit rating [to] 
create the opportunity for the marketplace to use the information to develop 
performance measurement statistics that would supplement those required to 
be published by the NRSROs themselves in Exhibit 1 to Form NRSRO.22   
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Whilst the intention and objective is laudable, and in line with our own proposal, I 
doubt whether it is practicable to leave it to “the marketplace”.  Doing such 
comparative exercises would have to be continuous and consistent; it would also be 
expensive.  Who would pay for it?  The “free rider” problem would be huge.  It has to 
be a separately established independent agency, though exactly who establishes it, 
either the government or the private sector, could be for discussion. 
 As a primarily statistical body, without concern for conduct, it should be 
possible to set a CRAAC up quite cheaply.  The industry would, I assume, initially 
pay for it pro rata to earnings.  Perhaps in subsequent years, the payment/premium 
could be related to the assessed relative accuracy, with those who did worst paying 
most.  Note that there are two dimensions to such accuracy; first, how close was mean 
predicted PD to actual average outturn PD; second, did the expected number of 
defaults lie within the upper confidence band.  Some method of weighting those two 
dimensions would need to be found. 
 This is not such a large step and, indeed, the SEC, as noted above, is 
considering imposing even stronger data reporting requirements.  Moreover, IOSCO 
has requested CRAs to publish information on historical default rates “in such a way 
to assist investors in drawing performance comparisons between different CRAs” 
(March 2008 proposed modification to Code of Conduct Section 3).23   Again and 
perhaps more important, the CESR May 2008 Report (CESR/08 – 277), p. 17, para 
72, records the following. 
 
The Participating CRAs continue to meet to discuss and develop potential 
initiatives and measures aimed at promoting confidence in the credit rating 
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process and structured finance market.  In their latest update24 the group is 
presenting a number of recommendations that the members are committed: 
- Plainly stating that the Participating CRAs do not and will not provide 
consulting, or advisory services to the issuers they rate, nor do their 
analysts make proposals or recommendations regarding the structure or 
design of structured finance products. 
- Conducting regular, periodic reviews of staffing needs, training and 
competences, as well as formal, internal reviews of remuneration 
policies and practices to ensure that they do not compromise analyst 
objectivity. 
- Working with market participants on measures that could enhance the 
quality and transparency of information regarding assets underlying 
structured finance securities available to the investing public. 
- Creating an industry portal to house the Participating CRAs’ 
performance studies and other relevant data. 
- Providing more disclosure about key model and methodology 
assumptions and stress-testing of assumptions.” 
 
Perhaps the key difference here is the insistence that the comparative assessment body 
should be independent of the CRAs themselves. 
 
Penalties and Pre-commitment? 
 
What is being proposed here is a quantification of ratings, so that ex post 
accountability can be more easily achieved in two dimensions.  The first and easiest is 
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a numerical estimate of the mean expected cumulative probability of default (PD), 
annually over its stated life for a debt instrument assessed as being within a given 
ratings class.  The second is a measure of the confidence with which that forecast is 
held, expressed as an upper band, which the distribution of defaults should only 
breach, say, 1 percent or 2½ percent of the time.  Both sets of data, on central 
tendencies and expected variance of PDs, provide necessary information for investors. 
 Pure concerns of reputation are likely to provide sufficient incentive for CRAs 
to aim to achieve the best possible point forecast so long as the initial forecast can be 
properly compared with actual outcome and comparisons between CRAs are 
published by an independent assessor.  But one of the problems with forecasts, 
especially with forecasts of PDs for innovative products, is that recipients have little 
idea of the uncertainty of such forecasts.  There is little incentive for the CRAs to 
reveal just how uncertain they may be. 
 So there is a case for requiring the CRAs not only to report an upper band, 
beyond which they expect defaults for any given asset class to fall very rarely (say 1 
percent or 2½ percent of the time) but also to pay a modest penalty if this is breached 
more often than expected.  This would be akin to the pre-commitment approach 
devised by Paul Kupiec for application to bank capital in several articles in the 1990s.  
The purpose of the penalties would be to provide a balance between CRA desire to 
indicate confidence in their own forecast by implying little uncertainty for 
promotional reasons against the cost and shame of having to pay such a penalty if the 
upper band was breached. 
 If the occasion of such a penalty being levied were to be published, as I would 
advocate, the cost to reputation would be greater and the actual amount of the 
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pecuniary penalty kept small.  It could then be applied to meet the running costs of the 
independent assessment body (CRAAC). 
 An alternative and possibly preferable approach, which I owe to Prof. Perry 
Mehrling, would be to require CRAs to purchase credit default swaps on the issues 
that they rate at the date of issuance and configured so that a default rate on such 
products greater than the upper confidence limit predicted by each CRA would 
generate a transfer to the current holder of that product.25  While this is a nice idea, 





There are only two big American-based CRAs, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, and 
one European-owned rival, Fitch, Inc.  This is not enough to provide proper 
competition.  The NRSRO procedure is not helpful (a kind of Catch 22).26  As argued 
earlier, government-backed agencies would not be credible. 
 The proposal here to provide independently assessed and quantified 
comparisons of ex post accuracy might help generate more competition.  A new 
entrant could establish a track record for greater accuracy (this is independently 
assessed) in a particular niche by exploiting a comparative advantage, perhaps rating 
one particular product line, with a small staff, and then build from that.  What 
investors want is forecast accuracy.  At present, they have no simple or 
straightforward way of doing that, (though large investors might do so by comparing 
the historical records of each of the large CRAs).  Consequently, most investors fall 





The main role of CRAs is to give a credit rating to new debt issues at the time of 
issuance.  One of the criticisms of CRAs is that they lag badly behind events in 
adjusting ratings in response to subsequent changes in the condition of such 
instruments.  While that charge is surely justified and has been empirically 
demonstrated, it is on this view, a misperception to expect CRAs to do much better 
than now.  They do not get paid for making ratings transitions27, and hence have 
neither the incentive nor the staff to monitor continuously the idiosyncratic behavior 
of myriads of individual debt issues.  They do have Merton-type time-to-default 
models, e.g. KMV, but these by definition lag behind market data and given model 
uncertainty, the CRAs would not necessarily rush to use such model estimates to 
make rating transitions.  If the issuer of existing debt instruments should issue a new 
instrument, that also may give a CRA grounds for revising earlier ratings; but issuers, 
in conditions where they face a potential down-grade, may defer new issues. 
 There may be a better way.  Banks have more incentive to maintain 
continuous monitoring of all their credit claims.  Moreover, under Basel II the larger 
banks are adopting the two Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approaches.  Why not 
require the IRB banks to confidentially report their current ratings assessments on a 
limited number of representative credit holdings?  The independent assessment body 
(CRAAC) would then average these,28 and publish them.  It would have much in 
common with the publication of London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR) estimates 
from individual bank data. 
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 This would provide a service to the banks that could compare their own 
assessment with the industry average.  It would provide a service for CRAs who 
would become free of an expensive and poorly provided requirement to provide 
subsequent ratings transition.  It would provide a service to investors who should then 
receive quicker and better information on ratings transitions. 
 
Summary of Recommendations 
 
(1) All CRAs should be required to provide confidential details of their ratings in 
a numerically quantified format to the Credit Rating Agency Assessment 
Centre (CRAAC), an independent assessment body 
(2) CRAAC should maintain ex post accountability of CRAs by comparing 
forecasts with out-turn and publish reports on comparative accuracy. 
(3) CRA forecasts should have two numerical dimensions, central tendency and a 
measure of uncertainty (forecast confidence).  The latter may need support 
from a modest pre-commitment penalty or by some other equivalent 
mechanism. 
(4) Ratings transitions should come from an averaging of IRB internal ratings, not 
from CRAs. 
(5) The industry should pay the costs of CRAAC. 
(6) Because of the long lag between forecast and out-turn, conflicts of interest do 
remain a valid concern.  This can be handled by appropriate adjustment of the 
payment mechanism and by requiring all products to be rated by two or more 
CRAs. 
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(7) The IOSCO Code of Conduct is best forgotten.  No other government 
intervention is necessary or desirable except to insure that CRAAC is 
independent, not captured by CRAs and adequately resourced from the 
industry.  Whether the CRAAC would be set up by the private sector or by the 
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1 My thanks are due, amongst others, to Jon Danielsson, Perry Mehrling, Robin Monro-Davies and 
Lionel Price for advice and suggestions, but all opinions and errors remain my own. 
2  Financial Markets Group and London School of Economics. 
3 The forecasting profession is, however by nature, somewhat disreputable.  Since all we have to go on, 
the available evidence, is historical experience, the basic assumption is that the future will be like the 
past, i.e. that the world and the economic/financial system within it is stationary; that assumption is 
most often invalid (black swans, etc.).  Moreover, our available data base is either too short to allow 
accurate statistical inferences, at least of extreme events, or so long as to include major structural 
regime changes, thereby making the earlier data irrelevant, or both at the same time. 
4One common complaint of regulators is that there is no central coordinating body for the CRAs, with 
which regulators can communicate; no Self Regulating Organization (SRO).  Given the importance of 
clean competition amongst CRAs, especially when there are so few, their reluctance to form a common 
organization is understandable and even commendable.  Making communications easier for regulators 
should not be a high priority. 
5Whilst the SEC found the output of the CRAs to be useful for this purpose, the SEC otherwise left 
them largely unsupervised and on their own prior to the Enron debacle.  Between 1975 and then, there 
were virtually no visits to NRSRO SRAs by the SEC.  Rosner and Mason (2007) state, p. 29, that “The 
SEC examines the ratings agencies every five years”. 
6 “Following the Enron collapse, the SEC submitted to Congress in January 2003 its report on the 
roleand function of credit rating agencies in the operation of securities markets in response to the 
Congressional directive contained in Section 702 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
The report was designed to address each of the topics identified in Section 702, including the role of 
credit rating agencies and their importance to the securities markets; impediments faced by credit rating 
agencies in performing that role; measures to improve information flow to the market from credit rating 
agencies; barriers to entry into the credit rating business; and conflicts of interest faced by credit rating 
agencies. The report addressed additional issues such as allegations of anti-competitive or unfair 
practices; the level of due diligence performed by credit rating agencies when taking rating actions; and 
the extent and manner of SEC oversight of credit rating agencies….. 
On 4 June 2003, the SEC issued a Concept Release, submitted for public comments until 28 July 2003. 
This work was considered by the SEC as part of their review of the role of credit rating agencies in the 
operation of securities markets. 
The SEC was seeking comment on several issues relating to credit rating agencies, including whether 
credit ratings should continue to be used for regulatory purposes under U.S. federal securities law and, 
if so, the process of determining whose credit ratings should be used, as well as the level of oversight 
that should be applied to such credit rating agencies.”   
From CESR/05 – 139b, (ibid), pp 8/9.  This Concept Release and the SEC study formed the basis for 
the CRA Reform Act, which became effective in June 2007.  Nine CRAs have registered as NRSROs 
under this legislative framework, as of May 2008, being:- 
 
 “A.M. Best Company, Inc., DBRS Ltd., Fitch, Inc., Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd., 
Moody’s Investor Service, Inc., Rating and Investment Information, Inc., Standard & Poor’s Ratings 
Services, LACE Financial Corp. and Egan-Jones Rating Company.”   
 
See CESR’s “Second Report to the European Commission on the compliance of credit rating agencies 
with the IOSCO Code: The role of credit rating agencies in structured finance.”, CESR/08 – 277, p. 11. 
7   “This report does not propose a preferred method for addressing CRA-related issues. Nor does this 
report endorse any particular regulatory approach jurisdictions may take regarding CRAs. Moreover, 
the report does not make judgments regarding the methodologies, approaches or business models 
CRAs may use. Rather, this report discusses certain key issues that securities regulators, CRAs and 
others may wish to consider when deliberating policy choices in this area. While some jurisdictions 
may decide to address the issues highlighted in this report through market mechanisms, others may 
decide to consider regulatory or other methods to address them.”  Ibid, p. 2.  
8 “Rating agencies that the market recognizes as credible and reliable can play a valuable role in global 
securities markets. Consequently, the Technical Committee has concluded that a set of IOSCO 
principles regarding the activities of CRAs would be a useful tool for securities regulators, ratings 
agencies and others wishing to improve how CRAs operate and how the opinions CRAs assign are 
used by market participants. As CRAs are regulated and operate differently in different jurisdictions, 
the following principles do not lay out a "one-size-fits-all" approach, but state high-level objectives for 
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which ratings agencies, regulators, issuers and other market participants should strive in order to 
improve investor protection and the fairness, efficiency and transparency of the securities markets and 
reduce systemic risk.” p. 1 
9 “3.4.  CRAs should publish sufficient information about the historical default rates of CRA rating 
categories and whether the default rates of these categories have changed over time, so that interested 
parties can understand the historical performance of each category and if and how ratings categories 
have changed.” 
10   “2.4  Reporting lines for CRA staff and their compensation arrangements should be structured to 
eliminate or effectively manage actual and potential conflicts of interest.  A CRA analyst should not be 
compensated or evaluated on the basis of the amount of revenue that a CRA derives from issuers that 
the analyst rates or with which the analyst regularly interacts.” 
11   Whereas the spate of down-grades of such ratings is evidence of that failure, we do not yet have 
complete data on the incidence of default, so the full story has yet to unfold. 
12In my view, the main problem was the failure of the model-builders in the CRAs to attach sufficient 
probability to a generalized price decline in US housing, on the grounds that it had not previously 
occurred in the historical data set that they were using. 
13 “2.5 The CRA should separate, operationally and legally, its credit rating business and CRA 
analysts from any other businesses of the CRA, including consulting businesses that may present a 
conflict of interest. The CRA should ensure that ancillary business operations which do not necessarily 
present conflicts of interest with the CRA's rating business have in place procedures and mechanisms 
designed to minimize the likelihood that conflicts of interest will arise. 
2.8 The CRA should disclose the general nature of its compensation arrangements with rated 
entities. Where a CRA receives from a rated entity compensation unrelated to its ratings service, such 
as compensation for consulting services, the CRA should disclose the proportion such non-rating fees 
constitute against the fees the CRA receives from the entity for ratings services.” 
14Also see, Daenen, P., (2008), ‘Rating and Regulation: Current Turbulent Conditions could be an 
Opportunity to Reform’, paper presented at the Finlawmetrics Conference at Bocconi University, 
Milan, organized by Prof. D. Masciandaro, June 12/13, 2008.   
15  “Conclusion:  CESR’s policy proposal 
 7.  CESR and market participants believe that there is no evidence that regulation of the credit 
rating industry would have had an effect on the issues which emerged with ratings of US sub prime 
backed securities and hence continues to support market driven improvement. Despite this conclusion 
CESR recognizes that there needs to be a much greater involvement from market participants including 
issuers and investors as well as the CRAs themselves to ensure improvement and discipline. Also 
CESR recognizes that the use of ratings in the regulatory and supervisory framework, such as the ECAI 
in the CRD, could induce uncritical reliance on ratings as a substitute for independent evaluation. 
 8.  CESR considers the IOSCO Code to be the standard on which CRA conduct of business 
should be assessed and believes that the IOSCO Code, including the proposed modifications, should be 
regarded as the minimum upon which to build the enhanced framework that CESR is now suggesting. 
CESR considers that the updated Code satisfactorily addresses most of the concerns raised in the areas 
covered in the report except those regarding ancillary and advisory services where there is a need for 
more clarity. CESR has informed IOSCO about this concern. 
 9.  Moreover, CESR does not consider the initiatives taken through the improvement of the 
IOSCO Code and the initiatives taken by the CRAs both as a group and individually, are sufficient 
given the influential role CRAs play in the structured finance sector. This leads CESR to believe there 
is a strong need to take a step forward in ensuring integrity and confidence in the rating industry and 
encouraging the effective use of ratings by investors. 
 10.  CESR therefore urges the Commission as an immediate step to form an international 
CRAs standard setting and monitoring body to develop and monitor compliance with international 
standards in line with the steps by IOSCO, using full public transparency and acting in a ‘name and 
shame’ capacity to enforce compliance with these standards via market discipline. 
 11.  In order for this body to work, CESR believes it needs the full support of the market and 
considers that it should be formed of senior representatives of the investor, issuer and investment firms’ 
communities from across various geographic areas to ensure market buy-in and the international nature 
of the body. In addition, CRAs should also be part of the body when acting in its standard setting 
capacity but not when performing its monitoring activity. The members of the body would be 
appointed in the majority by the international regulatory community and would be accountable to those 
that appoint them. 
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 12.  CESR takes for granted that CRAs will provide sufficient information to this body in 
order for it to fulfill its monitoring objective. 
 13.  If international regulatory involvement cannot be achieved in the short term, CESR 
recommend that this body is formed at an EU level. 
 14.  In the absence of support from market participants or failure of the body to meet the 
objectives of ensuring the integrity and transparency of ratings, CESR considers that this initiative 
would not add value and that the supervisory authorities should step in to ensure, probably through 
regulation, the integrity and quality of the rating process.”  CESR/08 – 277, p. 3. 
16 “3.5 The CRA should publish sufficient information about its procedures, methodologies and 
assumptions (including financial statement adjustments that deviate materially from those contained in 
the issuer’s published financial statements) so that outside parties can understand how a rating was 
arrived at by the CRA.  This information will include (but not be limited to) the meaning of each rating 
category and the definition of default or recovery, and the time horizon the CRA used when making a 
rating decision. 
3.6 When issuing or revising a rating, the CRA should explain in its press releases and reports the 
key elements underlying the rating opinion. 
3.7 Where feasible and appropriate, prior to issuing or revising a rating, the CRA should inform 
the issuer of the critical information and principal considerations upon which a rating will be based and 
afford the issuer an opportunity to clarify any likely factual misperceptions or other matters that the 
CRA would wish to be made aware of in order to produce an accurate rating.  The CRA will duly 
evaluate the response.  Where in particular circumstances the CRA has not informed the issuer prior to 
issuing or revising a rating, the CRA should inform the issuer as soon as practical thereafter and, 
generally, should explain the reason for the delay.” 
17   There is at least one agency, Egan Jones, working on this principle, and it now has SEC approval.  
The proprietors point to some good “calls” (though of course we do not know what bad calls they have 
made) and it seems to be making a profit.  But the business may work only because it is tiny – few 
enough subscribers not to spill the beans, but too few analysts to provide comprehensive coverage. 
18   This was noted by the Technical Committee of IOSCO in their September 2003 Report, pp 13/14,  
 
 “Another factor some commentators have suggested regulators may wish to consider is 
whether CRA subscribers receive ‘material information’ that places them at an advantage vis-à-vis 
investors relying exclusively on freely available public information.  This will depend on a 
jurisdiction’s definition of ‘material information’.  While some jurisdiction with selective disclosure 
prohibits explicitly exempt CRAs from this prohibition, many of these same jurisdictions only allow 
for this exemption if the CRA distributes the rating to the public.” 
 
 “For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s ‘Regulation Fair Disclosure’ 
specifically exempts CRAs from its prohibitions on selective disclosure by issuers of material non-
public information, provided the CRAs use the material non-public information solely for developing a 
rating, and the CRAs’ ratings are publicly available. 
19   Requiring the CRAs to do this annually would help to resolve the tedious, and often unhelpful, 
distinction between ‘through the cycle’ (TTC) and point in time (PIT) ratings.  At issue the estimate of 
PD over the next few years would have to be, in effect, PIT, whereas the estimates over the longer run 
would revert to TTC, as would be both desired and expected. 
For a brief discussion of subsequent ratings’ migration estimates see Section I below. 
20   Mason, J.R. and J. Rosner, (2007), ‘Where did the risk go?  How misapplied bond ratings cause 
mortgage backed securities and collateralized debt obligation market disruptions’, (May), available 
electronically at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027475. 
21 In the USA, unlike the UK and most of Europe, mortgage lending is ‘without recourse’, which means 
that once the lender has recovered possession of the house from a defaulting borrower, the lender 
cannot make any further claims on that borrower’s other assets or income.  So, when mortgage 
borrowers in the USA found themselves in negative equity, they would often walk away, posting the 
keys of the house back to the mortgage originator.  Mail with keys in it jingled; hence the term ‘jingle 
mail’.  
22   The full quotation from pp 67-69 runs as follows:- 
 
 “The Commission is proposing to amend Exchange Act Rule 17g-2 to add a new paragraph 
(8) to Rule 17g-2 that would require a registered NRSRO to make and retain a record showing all 
rating actions (initial rating, upgrades, downgrades, and placements on watch for upgrade or 
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downgrade) and the date of such actions identified by the name of the security or obligor and, if 
applicable, the CUSIP for the rated security or the Central Index Key (CIK) number for the rated 
obligor. Furthermore, the Commission is proposing to amend Rule 17g-2(d) to require that this record 
be made publicly available on the NRSRO's corporate Internet Web site in an interactive data file that 
uses a machine-readable computer code that presents information in eXtensible Business Reporting 
Language ("XBRL") in electronic format ("XBRL Interactive Data File"). The purpose of this 
disclosure is to provide users of credit ratings, investors, and other market participants and observers 
the raw data with which to compare how the NRSROs initially rated an obligor or security and, 
subsequently, adjusted those ratings, including the timing of the adjustments. In order to expedite the 
establishment of a pool of data sufficient to provide a useful basis of comparison, this requirement 
would apply to all currently rated securities or obligors as well as to all future credit ratings. 
 
 The goal of this proposal is to foster greater accountability of the NRSROs with respect to 
their credit ratings as well as competition among the NRSROs by making it easier for persons to 
analyze the actual performance of the credit ratings the NRSROs issue in terms of accuracy in 
assessing creditworthiness. The disclosure of this information on the history of each credit rating would 
create the opportunity for the marketplace to use the information to develop performance measurement 
statistics that would supplement those required to be published by the NRSROs themselves in Exhibit I 
to Form NRSRO. The intent is to tap into the expertise and flexibility of credit market observers and 
participants to create better and more useful means to compare credit ratings. This goal is to make 
NRSROs more accountable for their ratings by enhancing the transparency of the results of their rating 
processes for particular securities and obligors and classes of securities and obligors and encourage 
competition within the industry by making it easier for users of credit ratings to judge the output of the 
NRSROs.” 
23    “A CRA should publish verifiable, quantifiable historical information about the performance 
of its rating opinions, organized and structured, and, where possible, standardized in such a way to 
assist investors in drawing performance comparisons between different CRAs.” 
24  “Credit Rating Agencies’ Statement and Progress on Initiatives to Strengthen CRA 
Performance and Enhance Confidence in the Credit Rating Process, April 2008.” 
25 A credit default swap requires the protection seller, in this case the CRA, to pay over the nominal 
value of the bond in the event of that bond defaulting, to the protection buyer.  The purpose of the 
exercise is to impose a financial loss on the CRA giving the rating, should the outcome of that class of 
bonds be significantly worse than the CRA had predicted.  
26   As recorded by the May 2008, Technical Committee of IOSCO Report, p. 13:- 
 
 “Where government CRA recognition criteria are based on how extensively a CRA’s opinions 
are used by issuers and investors, such a situation obviously discriminates against new entrants.  
Moreover, to the extent that regulatory recognition is based on reliance by the market, and market 
reliance is influenced by regulatory recognition, the cycle of discrimination is perpetual...” 
27   This needs some minor qualification.  Some 15 percent of CRA income comes from their general 
research activities which includes the work that would lead to ratings’ migration.  The CRAs regard 
this as an integral part of their (research) role.  Even so, so long as it is not, and probably cannot be, a 
profit centre for them, they do not have sufficient incentives to carry out this task. 
 
28   CRAAC would also have to propose a common numerical scale for PD ratings in order to be able to 
average the separate ratings. 
 
 
 
